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The Dutch parliament broke new ground in 2002 when the Netherlands became the first 
country in the world to enact legislation permitting physician assisted death (hereafter 
PAD).1 However, the legislation by no means provides PAD on demand; Dutch citizens can 
only avail themselves of an assisted death provided their physicians consider that the 
legislative criteria have been met. Recent Dutch studies suggest that doctors are reluctant 
to provide an assisted death and it seems that other methods of attaining a self-appointed 
death are being utilised by individuals who are denied access to a medically assisted death. 
Two such methods that these individuals - PAD outlaws2 - may opt for, are an illegal assisted 
death involving lay assistors or a lawful method of a self-hastened death by stopping eating 
and drinking. Having analysed the limits placed on respecting patient autonomy under the 
Dutch model of PAD and paying special attention to the matter of existential suffering, this 
paper explores these two alternative methods of securing a self-determined death. It raises 
the question of how far the law should recognise autonomy in the context of PAD.  
  
 
The limits of autonomy in the context of lawful physician assisted death in the 
Netherlands 
The Dutch statutory law which enables physicians to practise PAD is the Termination of Life 
on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act of 2002 (hereafter the 2002 Act).3 
A doctor acting in compliance with the 2002 Act does not commit a criminal offence under 
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Articles 293 and 294 of the Dutch Penal Code, which prohibit euthanasia (the termination of 
‘another person’s life at that person’s express and earnest request’) and assisted suicide 
(‘intentionally assist[ing] another to commit suicide or provid[ing] him with the means to do 
so’). The doctor must act in accordance with the due care criteria laid down in the 2002 Act, 
as follows:  
 
 the patient made a ‘voluntary and carefully considered’ request;  
 the doctor informed her of her situation and prospects;  
 her suffering was ‘unbearable’ with ‘no prospect of improvement’ (the due care 
criteria have been interpreted as requiring a physical or psychological medical 
condition);  
 the doctor and patient were convinced that the suffering could not be alleviated 
through any other reasonable means;  
 the doctor acted with ‘due care and attention’;  
 the doctor consulted an independent physician who has given a written opinion as to 
the criteria being satisfied.4  
 
The doctor must then notify the municipal pathologist of the assisted death as required by 
the Law on Burial and Cremation.5 Regional Review Committees review reported cases of 
euthanasia and it is only if the particular Committee decides that the physician involved has 
not complied with the law, that the prosecution authorities become involved.6 Recent 




The Dutch law is framed around justifying the doctor’s actions on the basis of necessity and 
a conflict of duties between the duty to preserve life and the duty to alleviate suffering.8 
Although the value of autonomy is a commonly raised justification for permitting physician 
assisted death,9 it has in fact never been the formally recognised rationale behind the Dutch 
law.10 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams observe that the legal developments which led to 
permitting PAD: 
 
‘... began not so much with a demand for “patients’ rights” as with the insistence by 
doctors, supported after some initial hesitation by the Medical Association, that 
under limited circumstances, euthanasia is a legitimate medical procedure. This issue 
was legally formulated not so much in terms of what patients have a right to demand 
as in terms of what doctors are authorized to do.’11 
 
Yet whilst autonomy has not been the foundation upon which the PAD law has been built, it 
is an important value in Dutch society and culture and has featured in the assisted dying 
debate.12 The NVVE,13 the largest right-to-die organisation in the Netherlands, has recently 
observed that ‘the post–war generation – familiar with principals of freedom and 
responsibility anchored in our culture – is now steadily approaching the last phase of life. 
More so than previous ones, this generation will want to make its own choices... with regard 
to dying with dignity and the self chosen end of life.’14 
 
Such choices are only likely to be actionable in limited circumstances, however, under the 
current lawful model of PAD. Because this model is based on the medical professional’s 
assessment of the patient’s condition, whether or not the patient’s autonomous wish to die 
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is respected is dependent on the doctor’s judgement and it appears that one of the due care 
criteria in particular is hard to satisfy. Research findings suggest that the unbearable 
suffering requirement is the most difficult of the criteria for doctors to reach a judgement 
upon.15 This should not really come as a surprise, given that physicians are being asked to 
make an objective assessment of something that can surely only be measured accurately by 
the person subjectively experiencing the suffering. As Rietjens el al comment: 
 
‘... the question of whether and when symptoms lead to unbearable suffering 
ultimately depends on the experience of the person who is suffering, and hence is an 
individual matter depending on the patient’s personality, physical and mental 
perseverance, history and perceptions of the future. Hence what is still bearable for 
one person may be unbearable for another.’16  
 
The findings of one research study have revealed that physicians most frequently cite a 
failure to meet the unbearable suffering criterion as a reason for refusing a request for 
PAD.17 In cases where doctors refuse a request for PAD, it appears patients perceive that 
their physicians lack an understanding of their suffering and whilst patients emphasise 
psychosocial suffering, their doctors are more likely to focus on physical suffering.18 This 
presents a real problem in terms of respecting autonomy. The patient’s wish to die stems 
from their experience of suffering but this experience may only be relevant for the doctor 
when making her assessment if it meets her conception of the type and level of suffering 
required under the due care criteria. Thus, the patient’s autonomy will only be respected if 
his expression of autonomy meets an objective standard of (perceived) legitimacy. Notably, 
according to recent studies, it appears that doctors are reluctant to provide an assisted 
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death even when the due care criteria have been met19 and two out of every three requests 
for PAD are refused.20  
 
It is even less likely that an individual’s autonomy will be respected if she requests PAD on 
the basis of suffering that is not considered to have a medical origin but, rather, is 
existential in nature. It seems that approximately 400 individuals a year in the Netherlands 
request PAD because they are ‘weary of life’.21 Suffering caused by this state derives from 
psychosocial factors, ‘circumstances such as the loss of a partner, increasing isolation due to 
death of people around them, and physical ailments [which] can make everyday life… a 
negative experience’.22 It should be borne in mind that the concept of existential suffering is 
ill-defined.23 Furthermore, whether being tired of life even constitutes suffering has been 
contested. In Varelius’s view for example, ‘One can... be tired of living or have continuous 
feelings of futility and uselessness to the extent that one wants to die without suffering.’ 24 
Yet this is in discordance with the understanding of the Dijkhuis Committee, a committee 
established by the Royal Dutch Medical Association (KNMG) in 2001 to consider norms 
surrounding assisted dying requests in cases of existential suffering. In its Report, the 
Committee uses the phrase ‘suffering from life’ in order to convey the real impact of the 
suffering in such cases and defines this as suffering from the prospect of continuing to have 
to live when the individual experiences no or only limited quality of life and this results in a 
persisting wish to die, where the lack of or poor quality of life is not caused by a somatic or 
psychological condition.25 
 
Significantly, being tired of or suffering from life is not an acceptable ground for PAD for the 
majority of doctors, who do not see being weary of life as constituting unbearable 
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suffering.26 Moreover, in 2003, the Dutch Supreme Court judged that existential suffering is 
not a legitimate ground for lawful PAD in the Brogersma case.27 In this case, the defendant, 
Doctor Sutorius assisted his patient, Mr Brongersma’s suicide. Mr Brongersma was weary of 
life, which he considered to be futile and lonely without his deceased friends and family. He 
made repeated requests to his doctor to assist him in his suicide. The Court drew a 
distinction between suffering caused by a medical condition (whether mental or physical), 
and psychosocial suffering. In the case of the latter, a doctor’s medical expertise did not 
equip her or him to decide whether the due care criteria had been met.28 
 
But is it correct to exclude existential suffering from the lawful model of PAD? The Dijkhaus 
Committee recommends that existential suffering as well as suffering that stems from a 
medical condition should be considered to fall within the medical profession’s expertise, 
since both can be unbearable and hopeless. For the Committee, the source of the suffering 
should not be the deciding factor.29 This may be supported by research findings that reveal 
that being “tired of life” is also a cited reason for desiring an assisted death for individuals 
who have a severe disease.30 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams are critical of the limitation of the 
due care criteria to unbearable suffering caused by a medical condition. In their view, it is 
hard to defend a distinction between suffering derived from medical conditions and 
existential suffering, and any such distinction would be problematic in practice.31 Drawing 
this distinction is surely hard to defend on the basis of autonomy.32 Indeed, it seems that 
the exclusion of existential suffering from lawful model of PAD is currently a ‘hot topic’ in 
Dutch society. There have been calls for a change in law from the NVVE33 and a Citizen’s 
Initiative entitled ‘Accomplished Life’ was put forward in February 2010, demanding that 
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individuals over 70 who are tired of life should have the right to an assisted death.34 116,871 
signatures were gathered in support of the proposal.35  
 
It should be clear from the above that there is a real tension between the individual 
autonomy of those who desire PAD but are judged not to meet the due care criteria, and 
the views of medical profession and the law. Consequently, as Chabot and Goedhart note, 
‘it is to be expected that some individuals whose repeated and explicit request for PAD has 
been turned down will look for methods to control their death that will make them less 
dependent on the medical system’.36 One such method I will now explore is lawful, the 
other is not. 
 
 
Option one: stopping eating and drinking 
Research on the subject of a self-hastened death by stopping eating and drinking involving 
the examination of 110 cases where individuals had died via this method has been 
conducted in the Netherlands by Chabot.37 In 80% of these cases, the individuals were over 
the age of sixty and in 40%, they suffered from cancer. 32% of individuals had a serious 
somatic disease and in the remaining 28% of cases, the individuals did not have a serious 
illness or medical condition, but ‘had suffered seriously from ailments of old age (blindness, 
deafness, walking impairment, arthritic pains, speech and/or memory impairment)’.38 
Following a survey conducted on self-directed deaths occurring in the Netherlands between 
1999-2003, Chabot and Goedhart computed an annual frequency of 2.1% for deaths 
occurring by stopping eating and drinking while receiving palliative care, which, they note, 
appears to be roughly on a par with the annual number of PAD deaths.39 Notably, the 
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authors found that a request for PAD had been turned down in 49% of the cases where 
individuals had subsequently voluntarily refused food and fluids in their study.40 It is also 
significant that research conducted in another jurisdiction where physician assisted suicide 
is lawful - Oregon - has found that some patients who are denied access to physician 
assisted suicide choose to have a self-directed death by this method.41 The study involved 
307 hospice nurses, 102 of whom had cared for a patient who had hastened death by 
stopping eating and drinking in four previous years. The hospice nurses reported that ‘the 
most important reasons for the decision to stop food and fluids were a readiness to die, the 
belief that continuing to live was pointless, an assessment of the quality of life as poor, a 
desire to die at home, and a desire to control the circumstances of death.’42  
 
Chabot records the process and cause of a death by stopping eating and drinking, which 
occurs by dehydration or an intervening complication. After a period of time, the individual 
will experience a general weakness which ‘resembles the last phase of a fatal illness but 
without the symptoms of pain or breathing difficulties’. After about a week without fluid 
intake, the kidneys stop producing urine and thus the metabolic waste products are not 
removed from the blood. This usually leads to drowsiness and then ultimately ‘the heart can 
no longer beat regularly and the person will die while asleep from a cardiac arrest’.43 For 
individuals who were not in the terminal stage of an illness and stopped eating and drinking 
at the same time, death occurred after seven to fifteen days in 70% of the cases Chabot 
examined. In 20% of the cases, the individuals died after sixteen to thirty days. Although 
death took longer to occur for these individuals (because they had stopped eating first and 
then gradually stopped drinking), it seemed to be a less harsh process.44 In the remaining 
cases (just over 10%), death occurred over a longer period - after thirty one days or more. 
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This was because these individuals took longer to restrict their fluid intake.45 Chabot’s 
findings appear to tally with those of other researchers who have studied the length of the 
dying process where an individual stops eating and drinking concurrently.46 
 
The dying process in cases of stopping eating and drinking is thus a lengthy one and it is 
necessary to have some knowledge of the palliative care required to enable a death via this 
means to be ‘good’. Chabot emphasises that ‘the day-to-day care by relatives and nursing 
staff is indispensable during the process’, and ‘[a] good or bad death depends to a large 
extent on the quality of the care offered by well prepared and informed relatives, by nurses 
and by GP’s who have been trained in palliative care.’47 Palliative care (such as analgesics or 
antipsychotics) might be required to alleviate symptoms such as anxiety, pain or 
confusion.48 Thus, in order to be successful, this method of dying clearly requires assistance 
from others and importantly, it is likely that at least some of this will need to be provided by 
a health care professional.  Whilst, therefore, individuals who avail themselves of this option 
will not need to convince a medical professional that they satisfy any particular criteria 
relating to suffering, they will still be reliant on health care in order for the dying process to 
be tolerable.  
 
A common perception exists that a death by stopping eating and drinking will be an 
unpleasant one: ‘Many people think that stopping eating and drinking to hasten death will 
cause a great deal of suffering. However research... has shown that this does not necessarily 
have to be the case if the mouth care and any necessary pain management are administered 
effectively.’49 Good mouth care is necessary to keep one of the harshest symptoms at bay 
(the feeling of thirst), and to prevent fungal infections.50 According to Chabot’s research, 
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74% of relatives and others involved in the cases he examined considered the individual’s 
death to have been a dignified one.51 However, he also notes that there is a need for Dutch 
GPs to receive more training in the ‘terminal care’ that is required to better ensure that the 
individual’s experience of the dying process is ‘as favourable as possible’.52 
 
At certain times during the last decade, dying by stopping eating and drinking was a 
prominent feature within the Dutch public debate on assisted dying. Pool reports that it 
attracted significant media attention between 1996-1998. Initially, according to Pool, it was 
a paper written by Chabot in which he coined the phrase vertsterven to refer to a self-
appointed death by stopping eating and drinking that generated interest.53 Although Chabot 
suggested that stopping eating and drinking offered individuals a method of controlling their 
deaths, the issue became controversial because ‘[m]any interpreted versterven as a 
transitive verb, i.e. a kind of killing’.54 Consequently, the spectre of non-voluntary death 
raised its head, with relatives reporting that family members had been left to die via 
dehydration in nursing homes. Whilst the controversy subsequently died down, it may be 
difficult now for stopping eating and drinking to receive a ‘good press’ in the Netherlands 
because of the negative connotations attached to the phenomenon during the time that it 
was in the media spotlight. 
 
What should be apparent is that achieving a self-appointed death by stopping eating and 
drinking demonstrates both autonomy and self-determination because it is not an easy 
option.55 Indeed, it may turn out to be too difficult an option for some individuals and/or 
their relatives.56 Chabot notes that ‘Abstaining from eating and drinking could turn out in 
practice to be too hard for someone, or relatives might persuade their loved one to 
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postpone the decision to die, so that he/she starts eating and drinking again.’57 Yet the fact 
that such deaths occur demonstrates that some individuals clearly do have the 
determination to carry out their decision to achieve control over their death through this 
means. In fact, the research conducted on deaths via stopping eating and drinking in Oregon 
revealed that during the study period, the number of reported cases of hospice patients 
who died by stopping eating and drinking was almost twice as high as the number who had 
a PAD and the authors state that such deaths ‘may occur often enough to be of clinical 
relevance to hospice care across the United States’.58 
 
 
Option two: lay assisted suicide 
There are obvious reasons why an individual with a persistent wish to die might prefer the 
idea of an assisted suicide via medication undertaken with the help of an assistor over 
hastening death by stopping eating and drinking. Provided the right medication is obtained, 
then the result should be a more comfortable, much quicker death than stopping eating or 
drinking. As such, a lay assisted suicide is more likely to better reflect the idea of death that 
the individual desires. The nature of assistance required will depend on the individual’s 
particular situation. For instance, they may require assistance by way of acquiring the 
necessary medication, or physical assistance if they are physically infirm. If they have no 
knowledge of the ‘right’ medication to use, they will need advice, which can be obtained 
from right-to-die organisations.59 The greatest difficulty that an individual who wishes to 
commit suicide by medication is likely to face, and might well need assistance with, is 
getting hold of the necessary medication.60 It does seem, however, that some doctors are 
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prepared to knowingly supply pills and that some individuals are able to obtain medication 
by false pretences.61 
 
The 2002 Act only provides an exemption from the criminal offence of assisted suicide for 
physicians who comply with its provisions. Thus, if a lay person assists in another’s suicide 
and his actions are discovered, s/he faces prosecution and conviction under Article 294 of 
the Penal Code, for which the maximum penalty is three years. Case law suggests that the 
offence is made out where the individual provides the means to commit suicide, or is 
present at the suicide and takes an active role (giving instructions or directing the suicide, 
for instance).62 Whilst, therefore, the option of lay assisted suicide may offer a ‘better’ 
death than stopping eating and drinking, individuals who wish to avail themselves of this 
method must find someone who is willing to assist and run the risk of their actions being 
discovered, assuming that they themselves are prepared for their assistors to take this risk 
and face the possible legal consequences. 
 
There is a recent, well-publicised incidence of lay assisted suicide that has become known as 
the ‘Moek’ case. At 99 years old, Maria Heringa (‘Moek’) was a very independent woman 
who lived in a nursing home. She was tired of old age, felt she was increasingly losing 
control over her life and found no more pleasure in life. She requested PAD, but the doctor 
considered that she failed to meet the due care criteria and was unable to express her 
wishes with clarity. Her family were aware of her desire for an assisted death and she was a 
member of the NVVE. When her request for physician assisted death was turned down, 
Moek asked to speak to a member of the NVVE. This person suggested the possibility of 
stopping eating and drinking, but Moek did not feel able to do this.  The other suggestion 
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made was for Moek to gather and store pills which could cause her death if she took a 
sufficiently high dosage. Moek subsequently collected pills and showed these to her 
stepson, Albert Heringa, informing him of her intention to take her own life. However, 
Heringa realised that taking these drugs would not cause her death. Although he tried to 
dissuade her from her intentions, she was determined and adamant that she wanted to die. 
Thus, to enable her to commit suicide, he gave Moek anti-malaria medication he had 
obtained from a visit abroad, in addition to sleeping pills and anti-vomiting pills. On the 
night in question, he and his daughters stayed with Moek after she had taken the drugs and 
fallen asleep. Heringa was informed of her death by a member of the nursing home staff 
early the next morning. Although a doctor recorded Moek’s death as a natural one, Heringa 
had consulted a criminal lawyer and made a video-recording of what occurred. He did this in 
case of future prosecution, so that he would have evidence that she herself had made the 
final decision and taken the medication. It was decided that the video recording would be 
shown as a documentary on a Dutch television network as part of the NVVE’s Completed 
Life campaign (Heringa too is a member of the NNVE).63 He was subsequently questioned by 
the police and the Public Prosecutor in the Zutphen became involved.64 He is currently 
awaiting trial. It will be interesting to see the outcome of the Moek case in terms of 
Heringa’s punishment if he is found guilty by the court. Although the court may choose to 
impose a strict punishment to deter other lay assistors, it seems more likely that any 
sentence will be a lenient one given the previous sentences that have been imposed in more 
recent lay assisted suicide cases.65 
 
Besides its outcome, perhaps the greatest significance of the Moek case is that the video 
recording provided clear evidence of Heringa’s assistance and the prosecuting authorities 
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were made aware of his actions. In fact, very few non-medical cases of assisted dying are 
reported to the Dutch Public Prosecution Service. This suggests one of two things: either 1) 
that cases of lay assisted suicide rarely occur, or 2) that they are being reported as natural 
deaths by doctors and families. Research suggests that the latter is the more realistic 
explanation. In their study involving cases where individuals achieved a self-directed death 
by ‘independently taking lethal medication attended by a confidant’ (ILMC), Chabot and 
Goedhart note that ‘Many sudden deaths of elderly people who die at home in bed without 
any obvious signs of pill boxes or farewell letters pass unnoticed into the death statistics as 
a “natural death”. Some informants reported that a death by ILMC had been registered as a 
“heart attack” or just “frailty in old age”.’66  Of course, the likelihood of being prosecuted for 
assisting the suicide of a close relative of friend is reduced if one’s actions can be concealed 
from the authorities and there is evidence to suggest that a relative who assists may face a 
more sympathetic response from the prosecuting authorities than a member of a right to 
die organisation.67 It is worthy of note that in the cases where there have been 
prosecutions, the assistor tends to be a member of a right-to-die organisation.68 It is clear, 
therefore, that although lay assisted suicide remains an option, its unlawfulness places 
obstacles in the path of someone who is refused PAD and requires assistance to commit 
suicide. Not only must they somehow obtain the necessary medication, they must also find 
a lay person who is prepared to break the law and face the potential consequences of this.  
 
 
Conclusion: between a rock and a hard place? 
A Dutch resident who has an enduring wish to die but does not meet the lawful criteria for 
PAD and does not wish to end their life by more violent means, faces a stark choice. They 
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can act within the boundaries of the law and elect to stop eating and drinking, but this 
entails a slower, less pleasant death than that achieved through PAD. Or if they are unable 
or unwilling to self-hasten their own death in this way, and cannot commit suicide without 
assistance, they could look to a relative or a friend for assistance to die an ‘easier’ death via 
medication. But they then take the risk that their relative or friend will be prosecuted for 
assisting them if their actions are detected. 
 
On the one hand, it seems unjust that those who are deemed to meet the due care criteria 
have access to PAD, when others who also consider their suffering to be unbearable and 
have an equally persistent desire to die are denied PAD because of a strict interpretation of 
the due care criteria and an objective assessment that their suffering is not unbearable. Yet, 
on the other hand, necessary limits must be set on autonomy to keep lawful assisted death 
within certain boundaries and to avoid a trip down the slippery slope. And it is important to 
remember that the rationale behind the Dutch PAD law is not autonomy, but rather, 
necessity and the conflict of duties faced by a physician. As such, it is legitimate to maintain 
the restriction that the individual must be suffering unbearably from a medical condition, 
provided existential suffering has been appropriately categorised as non-medical and 
provided that physicians are assessing the level of suffering correctly. I have suggested that 
the categorisation of such suffering can be challenged and have highlighted the difficulties 
doctors face in applying the unbearable suffering criterion generally, which can only be 
exacerbated when the suffering lies outside of what they perceive to be the medical realm.  
 
The fact that cases of self-hastened death by stopping eating and drinking and lay assisted 
suicides are occurring suggests that at least some of those for whom life has become 
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subjectively unbearable for non-medical reasons (or, at least, reasons that are deemed 
illegitimate under the lawful medical model of PAD) have a persistent desire to die. The 
strength of their autonomous wish to die and growing public support for the extension of 
law to cases where individuals are ‘weary of life’ indicates that self-directed death in the 
Netherlands is not a matter that will go away. It should give us pause for thought that even 
in a jurisdiction where PAD is lawful, there are still PAD outlaws who are left between a rock 
and a hard place when trying to achieve their desire for a self-appointed death. 
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